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ABSTRACT 
 
 
During the conceptual design phase of industrial processes, there is a need to 
make quick decisions on the screening and selection of alternatives. These decisions are 
typically based on techno-economic criteria and sometimes include environmental 
aspects. Safety considerations usually come as an afterthought. A designer charged with 
developing the conceptual process flowsheet for a new plant often cannot access the 
information needed for conventional safety analysis due to the lack of sufficiently 
detailed design data and time restraints. This is heightened in operations without 
extensive historical data such as processes that are small, produce specialty chemicals, or 
use novel processes. Given the significant gains that can accrue by including safety 
considerations during the conceptual design phases, there is a critical need to develop 
systematic approaches that aid the process designer in incorporating safety during the 
early stages of process design. This thesis turns a literature index into a process 
flowsheet development tool. The revised index is referred to as the Integrated 
Environmental, Health, and Safety index (IEHS). It accommodates the nature of early 
process synthesis and conceptual design work. It also accounts for categories not directly 
covered before such as maintainability, process control and overall process structure. 
The main focus of IEHS is to provide the designer with insights about the consequences 
of making design decisions and to provide a rational basis for the incorporation of safety 
issues on par with design methodologies and economic metrics. Through the use of 
IEHS, process designs failing to meet quantitative risk limits are eliminated from further 
consideration or revised to meet the desired limits early enough in the design work 
process. A case study is solved for the design of a dimethyl ether process to illustrate the 
applicability of IEHS in the early design phase. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The early phases of flowsheet synthesis and conceptual process design are 
characterized by lack of time, an abundance of stress and numerous meaningful design 
decisions. There is a need to quickly assess different pathways toward an overall better 
design. A common approach is to conduct preliminary screening based on top-level 
economic feasibility. However, this may obstruct the effect of the decision in the 
economic translation process. Other process objectives such as operability, safety, and 
health, and environmental issues typically are not accounted for in the early design 
stages. Additionally, many hazards and design complications are first set in this phase. 
Therefore, there is a need to incorporate these issues in the early stages of process 
synthesis and design. A tool capable of predicting unacceptable designs likely to lead a 
high level of accidents, releases or shutdown time would address all of these concerns. 
This is in an effort to analyze the system holistically, eliminate unacceptable options and 
communicate early decisions to upper management. 
The tool’s approach is methodical accounting of all the different negative effects 
of a situation. To be used alongside more rigorous tools like process design tools and a 
technoeconomic study, the tool should primarily be based on defensible first principles 
and process phenomena. It is worth noting that if the procedure to use the index is 
lengthy, a designer is not likely to use it. The ease of access to the inputs and outputs of 
the assessment approach is crucial for the system to be useful. On the other hand, the 
designer needs to know exactly what goes into the procedure and must have the ability to 
change the data flow so that the procedure fits the conceptual-design needs. The output 
needs to have a clear path for a solution, or suggests the right questions to ask. This 
seems like a simple requirement, however even tools like a HazOp team or a safety 
expert may have difficulty meeting these goals. For a designer to complete the whole 
process of optimizing risk, the relevance to the process conditions need to identified so 
that corrective actions may be taken and feed back into the index. Additionally, choosing 
between alternatives and pathways in the design requires consistent metrics so that the 
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comparisons are meaningful and decisions can be quantified and justified. The whole 
range of values needs to be reliable and qualitatively associable so that the index can be 
set as a full constraint and not a boolean. This then requires both, a justification that is 
realistic and meaningful as well as an automated procedure. If these factors were to be 
realized, integration into a designer’s workflow would be seamless. Developing the 
Environmental Health and Safety (EHS) index
1
 into an index that addresses all these 
concerns and does this seamless integration with other process synthesis and conceptual 
design tools is the goal of this paper. 
One of the most well-known tools for incorporating a safety assessment into the 
design phase is the Dow Fire and Explosion Index
2
. While it offers several advantages, it 
has some limitations because the variables are not continuous, the numbers have to be 
looked up in their own database and some of the data may not be available early enough 
in process synthesis. Additionally, many concerns and additions in this phase cannot be 
inputting into the formulation. This lack of resolution in the formulation results in a loss 
of information and a loss of some of the impacts of a design decision. Even though this 
index has been updated numerous times, has been automated
3
 and even has been used 
for optimization
4
 in terms of unsafe or safe, the fact remains that the main persuading 
power of the index is from expert opinion. 
Another index is that is widely cited is Hazard identification and ranking system 
(HIRA)
5
. One of the features of this index divides and classifies process units based on 
their function. This is a necessary step for a design tool within the phase tasked with 
separating the process into different units. Many concerns were checked on a 
classification basis with an eye towards mirroring the first principle knowledge. These 
aspects will be taken almost directly from HIRA. The problem is the need for some 
numbers that will not be known in this early design phase like absolute distance away 
from other units. The fault in this index is that it did not go far enough with the first 
principle calculations, using stipulated penalty calculations right before an endpoint or 
qualitatively rich value could be obtained. 
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Throughout the literature there was a lack of quantifying environmental 
considerations, unit interactions and process control and other mitigation techniques. An 
environmental objective is seen as a subject that should be done by experts at the very 
end of the design when it is entirely too late or too costly to do any significant changes. 
Unit interactions or process structure hazards have been acknowledged before like in the 
Comprehensive Inherent Safety index (CISI)
6
 but could not be accessed directly due to 
lack of failure data. In the Inherent safety index (ISI)
7
,  these types of interactions were 
said to be unquantifiable and could only be assessed using case-based reasoning. 
Mitigating factors has often seen to be used as a credit system after the fact. An index 
that makes this a legitimate element is the Safety weight hazard index update of the 
HIRA index (SWeHI)
8
 which takes into account human factors and mitigation solutions. 
The problem is, like HIRA, it is too detailed for this phase but can be adjusted to fit this 
need.  
On a structural note, in the literature the question of control of the data flow 
comes into question. Dependencies and the manipulation of the data often have to go 
through statistical models or complicated aggregation schemes. If a designer wanted to 
use this index seriously, they would have to be confident in answering the question 
“Where did this number come from and what are its implications?” At a glance, they 
should be able to figure out what the value means and what specific aspect of the plant 
needs to be changed.  
The EHS index proposed by Koller et al.
1
 offers a different relationship with the 
data than other tools. The structure is modular with independent impacts called 
parameters like fire, acute toxicity etc. For a single parameter, it can accept multiple 
inputs across the spectrum of information quality with the default being SDS 
information. This allows for some malleability of the index to fit whatever useful 
information the end user has available. Additionally, this allows novel chemicals and 
reaction pathways to be included even if they did not exist when the index was created. 
The output is immediately digestible because the index ranges from zero to one with 
zero being a relatively benign situation and one being a dangerous situation. This comes 
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without loss of the underlying equations as it also shows exactly how the number was 
calculated with the parameters and the equations used. These equations are compiled 
through scaling of literature equations or regressions on empirical data. Both of these 
can be argued for or against by critics, developers or users and can be substituted for 
updated or corrected models without the need to invoke subjective opinions. For 
optimization, these equations are continuous and many are linearized versions of higher 
order equations. The proposed index uses the EHS index as a base because of these 
reasons. The two indices maintain these principles throughout but the IEHS index takes 
more situations taken into account, directly uses many models, and changes the general 
direction of the index toward process synthesis and conceptual design. The following 
section provides the details of these differences and the development of the proposed 
index. 
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2 OVERVIEW OF REVISED INDEX 
The main EHS features can be found imbedded in IEHS as one set of parameter 
calculations called “method”. This is combined with other methods that make use of 
information that has emerged from this stage. The first method is Chem. which is the 
Initial Values from the EHS index done for modern databases and additional 
calculations. The Fate index and Technology factors are expanded for all the parameters 
and melded with other models into two new methods called Secondary effects and 
Vessel. Most of the equation level changes are made by going through the basic 
principles to get the relationships, often taking the calculations a step further towards 
these original equations. This simplifies the aggregation steps since one can assume that 
all the science will be found within the methods. For instance, the aggregation worries 
about chemicals in the EHS index and subsequent updates
9, 10
 are alleviated by a new 
method, Mix, which calculates the interactions between the chemicals. Additionally, the 
parameters will be expanded from 11 to 13 by splitting up fire and explosion as well as 
runaway reaction probability and expected damage from a runaway reaction. 
The EHS index requires updating for this phase because it was developed for the 
Input Output and reaction pathway phases of process development. The immediate 
impact of this is the amount of information that can be processed with the capability of a 
process simulator (e.g., ASPEN Plus) as well as the sheer number of units in a chemical 
plant. The end user of this index is working on a different problem and has to be able to 
control the flow of data for different objectives. Additionally, the abundance of stress 
and lack of time speckle this phase’s workflow much more heavily than the previous 
phase. These are the reasons behind the structural changes, automation efforts and the 
reworking of the base equations. 
New models are introduced to bring in maintainability and operability into the 
early design phase. This is done through new methods called, Vessel and Unit-Unit that 
use failure rates and upset conditions respectively. Traditionally, these types of 
calculations have been omitted due to lack of information
6
,  lack of confidence in the 
equations used
11
 or a concentration on inherently safer. However, a tool’s omission of 
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the assessment of the defining quality of this phase, the individual units and their 
connections, should render it unusable. The procedure to build the individual equations 
of the previous models will be applied to these new methods so the numbers and 
formulations are comparable. However, the data collection is different as failure data, 
qualitative ranking systems and iterating over the rest of the index are quite different 
than gathering chemical hazard data. These calculations can only be done within a 
reasonable time with an automated system. 
Along these lines, this index should be used as a tool for whatever questions the 
user has about a given PFD. Thus, it is not necessarily an inherent safety index since the 
information is parsed solely on its usefulness. However, a designer can use the index to 
find an inherently safer solution due to having enough resolution to source back 
problems at the plant level back to the chemicals. Another designer could also use the 
index to find the areas of higher risk and implement safeguards or optimize the plant to 
reduce one unit’s impact. Additionally, inherently safer technologies can be added to the 
design through the Vessel method while other solutions can be inputted through 
changing the design directly. These solutions often fare better in the index due to being 
able to do the job more reliably than a risk reduction solution. 
The merit of such design solutions is readily observed through the output of this 
index. The modular structure allows the end user to see exactly how much of an effect 
focusing on one area would have to the overall score. In this way, it sets up targets for 
each of the methods, the individual parameter, the chemicals and the units themselves. 
These are only theoretical targets in real life, but many equations are bounded between 
near benign to dangerous conditions. Therefore, many of these targets can be reached 
with optimization tools. Along with the use of filtering of the right information, and 
analyzing the entire plant as an interdependent system, this use of targeting is why the 
index can be called “Integrated.” 
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3 APPROACH 
 
With respect to ease of use and automation, the procedure of using the index 
should be quick, simple and easily incorporated into different workflows. There are three 
different parts to this system: the input, the program and the output. 
 
3.1 Input 
The required inputs for the program to run are discussed in Table 1. For 
simplicity, csv, xls or xlsx documents are labeled as xls. The inputs are geared around 
multiple data inputs for a single scenario. One or more can be entered or left blank to 
default the analysis to the SDS or regulation requirements. 
 
 
 
Table 1. Description of the required inputs for the program to run. 
 Description Sources Format 
Chemical Process 
Safety Sheet 
Basic safety properties of all 
the chemicals that appear in the 
design.  
SDS sheets, Literature, 
Online databases 
.txt 
Design information 
report 
Process unit information A simulator (e.g. 
Aspen Plus) / Rough 
hand calculations 
.txt / 
.xls 
Stream Table A table of the properties of all 
the streams in the process. 
A simulator (e.g. 
Aspen Plus) / Rough 
hand calculations 
.xls 
Chemical 
Reactivity 
Worksheet 
(CRW)
12
 Report 
A government program that 
simulates a solution to tell if 
there will be any evolved gases 
or side reactions 
The report of the 
program with all the 
chemicals in one 
solution 
.txt 
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The flexibility of these inputs using data readily available allows all designs in 
this stage to use this index. When a design is just an Input output structure, the index 
mostly reverts back to the scope of the original index. The changes are with the methods 
Mix assuming that any of the chemicals in the plant could come into contact with each 
other and Vessel using a plant-wide failure rate that can be changed for a specific process 
or industry with the availability of some semi-quantitative data or prior knowledge. On 
the other spectrum, the end of the design phase has vague information about siting and 
the unit specific economics that can be added to complement the analysis. 
Along with the required sources, there is a number of additional information that 
the program can process. In terms of chemical properties there are two supplements to 
the process safety sheet, the simulator’s chemical estimation report and the quantitative 
structure activity relationships (QSAR) values. The estimation report uses the power of 
the simulator to get correlations for many properties that are temperature dependent (e.g. 
CP) or otherwise (e.g. acentric factor). Without these the program has alternatives like 
generalized models, the ideal gas law or user inputted literature correlations. The QSAR 
calculations can predict properties of chemicals from quantum mechanical variables 
relayed to a statistical regression. This can be used to estimate toxicology, flash points 
and environmental variables for exotic or novel chemicals. The level of accuracy and the 
computing power required is dependent on the model used to predict these variables. For 
this application, a simple model is sufficient, so EPA’s toxicity estimation software tool 
(TEST)
13
 can be used which is free and includes the literature value if available. 
In terms of how the program is run, there is also an input for user-weights and 
unit alterations. The user-weights allow a designer to customize the run and the 
aggregation to whatever is fit for the specific case study including using mass-weighted 
averages. The alterations worksheet is used to tell the program of any information not 
captured by the design information report. This includes process control, end of the pipe 
technologies, novel processes and mitigation measures. This is explained in detail in 
Section 4. 
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3.2 The program 
The program was written in MatLab and runs with references and analysis types 
given in a separate configuration text file. This makes it easy to change the files or 
analysis types by changing the text file or writing a batch script. The program itself uses 
some nonlinear solving routines, but largely it uses basic algebra and recursion to 
compute the index. The program runs with minimal interaction, creating the templates 
for input files if they were omitted. Many values can be done by hand if need be and user 
specified weights can be used to customize the analysis. Run time for 36 unit plant with 
12 chemicals was around 2 minutes with the number of chemicals being the biggest 
factor for speed.  
3.3 The output 
The output is an Excel spreadsheet with all the numbers and analysis. Every 
number is outputted with its justification or intermediate variables listed at the bottom. 
This could include what equation was used, the method added or the details of the 
aggregation step. The beginnings of a statistical analysis are done with a stream table 
and unit table ordering each using the index. From this, one can easily see the areas that 
are most at risk and exactly how with specifics on the parameter, method and chemicals 
in both output tables. 
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4 CALCULATIONS – DEVELOPMENT PROCEDURE 
To develop all these equations and to satisfy the methodical portion of the goal, a 
rigorous procedure was used. One route is to use a literature variable or a predicated 
variable as a representative for a given parameter and method. Another route is to 
reproduce the detailed engineering calculations with a number of assumptions 
appropriate for the stage. This would result in some consequence or end point type 
variable that can be turned into an index using physical limits and accepted values. Other 
values that use more complicated models like Vessel or Unit-Unit ultimately use a 
combination of these two routes to transfer the derived variables into an index value. 
Below are two examples of this process. All the equations used are given in Table A.1.  
4.1 Literature procedure 
Early in the index, many variables are composed of literature values like 
regulations or recommended levels. These include things like flammability regions 
(LFL, UFL) or decomposition half-life. Other times, calculated variables are used either 
from key values in the base first principle proof, approximated literature values, 
nondimensional numbers governing the system. The procedure to develop the index 
calculation for this chosen variable is the same for both and is as follows: 
 
1. Pick a phenomenon  
2. Pick the parameter and method that the phenomenon best describes 
3. Go through the literature and figure out which a key variable 
4. Derive its relationship with end point values through a first principle equation or 
a correlation that tries to model some of the science. 
5. Plot the distribution of this variable and its effects 
6. Determine the scale (logarithmic, linear, etc.)   
7. Pick a some indicative values (benign, dangerous, etc.) from known effects 
8. Regress a line between the two values using: f(benign point) = 0, f(dangerous 
point)= 1 
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The first three steps are to find out the scope of the proposed index calculation in 
terms of what it is going to model (step 1), how will it be used in the overall structure of 
the index (step 2) and, most importantly, what will it use (step 3)? Going through how 
regulations are used in detailed calculations or what are the scientifically significant or 
useful equations on the subject. Here, “scientifically significant” means either a central 
first principle equation or a correlation that is physically relevant.  
The rest of the steps involve the creation of the index. The equations that were 
studied in step 3, can be scaled for the given variable to get a relationship for step 4. 
Going through the literature and case studies to find the normal values for this index will 
produce the distribution in step 5. The scale of this distribution in step 6 can come from 
inspection or can be assumed from literature if you have, say, a correlation for a power 
law relationship. There are five indicative values that should be obtained for step 7: 
mostly harmless, benign, worrisome, dangerous and immediately dangerous to life. The 
final formula for the specific situation is found by regression on these points on the 
given scale to form a line. After this process, the developed function is inserted into the 
designated spot in the code and another calculation can be formulated.  
4.2 Model procedure  
Many of the steps in the previous section can be circumvented with a rigorous 
model that predicts an end-point value directly. This end-point will often have some sort 
of qualitative scale or a physical scale that is immediately obvious to translate to an 
index. For example, take the end-point of “% permanently affected” from an exposure of 
a chemical. This has physical bounds at zero and one already built in. Additionally, one 
can grasp what the value means in terms of effects. 
For the expected damage of a runaway reaction in the Chem. method, a direct 
model is used to get a value of percent of safety equipment destroyed. This was done by 
getting the TNT equivalent energy of all of that chemical in the unit. Assuming a loss of 
containment this energy was turned into overpressure at a certain distance. The distance 
used was 15 m which is the minimum recommended distance given by the CCPS. This 
overpressure was turned into percent of equipment damaged using a literature probit 
12 
 
calculation. To get an index value, the physical limit of 0% affected was used as a 
benign value and 50% as a dangerous value as shown below. 
50
%
Chem AffectedExp.Damage   
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5 DETAILS OF EVALUATING THE IEHS INDEXI 
5.1 Structure and overview of the index 
The structure of the index, shown in Figure 1, follows the path that the design 
makes from the input output structure in the previous phase to a completed flowsheet at 
the end of the phase. The index goes from an assessment of the chemicals and reactions, 
to a mixture of chemicals, to the material containing the process, to the different 
conditions in the unit, to a system of units connected together. Going from one step to 
another involves a set of assumptions about the design. When the chemicals are mixed 
together the assumption is that they do not interact with each other. The methods are 
supposed to correct for these assumptions. 
The problem is to get a real world assessment at every stage from a basis of the 
chemical used in the plant. Thermodynamics has a similar problem of getting 
approximations of properties that cannot be empirically tested for, like Gibbs free 
energy. One solution is to use residual properties to make use of something that is easy 
to calculate, like the ideal gas versions of the properties, and then add the effects of the 
residual properties to get a real value. In the same way, at each stage of the aggregation, 
the index will assume that the higher level effects are negligible by doing a simple sum 
of the values then try to adjust that number using the relevant method which assesses 
those higher level effects. These methods after the base calculation of Chem. have a 
range from -1 to 1 with -1 being helpful or dilution type effects and 1 being dangerous 
effects. The hope is that the values are centered on a value of zero or “no effect.” 
The result of an aggregation is called a dangerous property as a nod to the 
original index. At the beginning there are three dimensions, the different chemicals, the 
                                                 
 
I
 In this section, the calculation justifications are done in the context of a first assumption in the 
process flowsheet design phase. The assumptions used and the definition of the indicative index flags 
(benign and dangerous, etc.) are only applicable in this phase and with the context of these equations. 
Furthermore, these qualitative definitions are used for clarity. “Benign” values is really shorthand for 
“relatively benign or hazard undetectable by this calculation method”. This is the same for “dangerous” or 
any other qualitative value used from this point on. Furthermore this endeavor and most of the index was 
at least inspired by the original EHS index
1
. 
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unit that it is in and the parameter that it represents. At the final system-wide level, there 
should only be the different parameters to assess the hazards. The logical places in the 
design to collapse these other dimensions are shown in Figure 1, with the upper case 
sigma. The program default for this is to take the average, best case and worst case 
aggregation along that dimension. The parameters are done separately since the 
assumption that they affect one another is taken care of in the Secondary effects method. 
The end user can specify if they want custom weights or mass average weights in these 
collapsing steps. These are not defaults because the mass is already taken into account in 
the methods wherever science dictates. The result of this structure is shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The overall structure of the index 
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Quantities at a certain step in the design are designated as dangerous properties 
as a nod to the original index. In Figure 1 the steps of calculating the index is shown and 
laid out explicitly below. 
 
1. Calculate Chem., Mix, and Vessel parameters 
2. Calculate Sec. Effects using information from Chem. and the input information 
3. Add Chem. and Sec. Effects together to get Effective Dangerous Properties 
(EDP) 
4. Aggregate the chemical dimension using user weights, average or worst case 
scenario 
5. Add the Mix values to create the Mixed Dangerous properties (MDP) 
6. Add the Vessel values to the MDP to create the Contained Dangerous 
properties (CDP) 
7. Iterate steps 1-5 on the different conditions found in the unit and calculate 
HotSpot 
8. Iterate steps 1-5 on the different upset conditions in the plant and calculate 
Unit-Unit 
9. Add the HotSpot values to the CDP create the Unit Dangerous properties 
(UDP) 
10. Aggregate the unit dimension using user weights, average or worst case 
scenario 
11. Add the Unit-Unit values to create the Integrated Dangerous Properties (IDP) 
 
As a basis, the chemical specific method, Chem. is assessed from the chemicals 
found within a unit and the process conditions. This is done on a chemical by chemical 
basis by going through their structure and their physical properties. The assumption used 
here is that the parameters themselves are not coupled with each other. With parameters 
like “Fire” and “Probability for a runaway reaction” it is safe to assume that one may 
lead to another. The situation becomes more dangerous when there is a chemical with 
multiple hazards that can trigger one another. Additionally, some of the information 
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about the chemicals may not be captured with just the1 chemical values like if a 
chemical was only appreciably toxic for one mode of intake. This is when the Secondary 
effects method is used to make the Effective Dangerous Properties (EDP). Design 
variables in this stage do not have that much sway over these methods so they are 
considered the chemical specific methods.  
Next the chemical dimension is collapsed with the assumption that there are no 
interactions between the different chemicals. This is checked by the Mix method which 
goes through the interactions between all the chemicals in the solution. The equations 
that make up Mix are a combination of parsing the output of the chemical reactivity 
worksheet, some mixed versions of the equations in Chem., and dedicated models for 
interaction effects. These are done as a solution where possible since binary interactions 
analyze a system that does not exist in the final product just like the chemical specific 
model. When this is added to the previous step it becomes the Mixed Dangerous 
Properties (MDP).  
Another assumption that was used up until now was that the process units 
themselves will never break down or lose containment of the process. The Vessel 
method goes through a risk assessment for a loss of containment in each of the scenarios 
outlined by the parameters. A base failure rate from a lookup table for each ASPEN Plus 
simulation model is used by adjusting it with “unit conversion” type calculations. The 
units of the base failure rate are of “standard process conditions” and “without any 
alterations”. The model is first adjusted for the extremity of the process conditions, 
namely its temperature and pressure. This uses a given extreme condition for the process 
unit type and the failure rate if that unit reaches that condition. The design condition is 
assessed from a regression between the normal process condition and the extreme 
condition. The other adjustment is in the alterations on a unit, which can include 
everything from process control to end of the pipe technologies to a more rugged 
material of construction. Alterations are then anything about the design that is not 
included with the process unit type. The designer should have some thoughts about what 
units are easy to control or what additional gadgets are required for the design to run in 
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the next phase or already planned by the chemist. These are all vague ideas with an 
incredibly low amount of information or hard numbers. However, these adjustments 
should be able to swing risk assessments by orders of magnitude due to how closely they 
manage the risks of the plant.  
This is accomplished with a semi-quantitative risk assessment on each of the 
proposed enhancements. First, the alteration is classified in how it helps the system in 
terms of changing the base failure rate, the failure rate for the extreme conditions, 
detection of a loss of containment or the mitigation of an event. It is classified into the 
specific parameters or dangerous conditions it protects against. The designer then 
evaluates the system using a ranking scheme and a rubric in the categories of strength, 
maintainability, and reliability. This introduces a wealth of possibilities for the types of 
systems that can be included. An inherently safer solution would have the benefit of high 
scores for maintainability and reliability but it still has to get high marks in strength, or 
in other words, do its job. Alternatively, if the problem can be easily solved with another 
material of construction or a thicker hull, the system would be able to see this with the 
same formulation. This area highlights how every method can be approached using an 
inherently safer approach or through a system level risk reduction point of view.  
Once the process units are created, this Vessel method is added to the dangerous 
properties which create the Contained Dangerous Properties (CDP). Up until now, one 
condition was used to assess all the methods. For a reactor, a litany of properties is 
changing and some chemicals may even be emerging from the solution. These dynamics 
need to be captured by the system to accurately judge a unit over whole length of the 
unit. This is done in the method, HotSpot that redoes the index (up until the CDP) for the 
different conditions found in a unit. For all the conditions that can change, the index is 
redone on the base unit with that condition changed to the final value. The base unit is 
either an average value of the conditions or the output condition where appropriate (e.g. 
a CSTR). In the future, more conditions could be tracked and more intermediate points 
could be examined. The final value of HotSpot is equal to the difference between the 
average index value of all the conditions and the index value of the base condition used. 
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This is the error that would have happened if you just took the base condition as a 
representative for the entire unit. This is done for all the parameters and then added to 
the CDP to become the final unit-dependent value, named Unit Dangerous Properties 
(UDP).  
The units are collapsed with the assumption that the units are not affected by 
each other. This is tested in the method Unit-Unit where the upset conditions are 
calculated. There are two parts of this problem: abnormal event mitigation and process 
control. The model generates different upsets using HAZOP methodology and then 
assesses how well the downstream units handle the upset. For the abnormal event 
mitigation, different upsets are created using guide words like “more” or “less” on 
different process conditions like pressure and temperature. On the process control side, 
these scenarios are tested in the model of the plant for  risk, the index up to this point, 
and evaluated for “overshoot” from the model in the normal state. The qualitative 
definition of Unit-Unit is a measure of the robustness of the system to an upset for that 
stream. Once this is added to the combined version of UDP, the dangerous property is 
said to be representative of a system wide approach to the plant and is said to be an 
Integrated Dangerous Properties (IDP). 
5.2 Chemical method (Chem.) 
5.2.1 Overview 
Initially, a designer would try to gather basic information about the chemicals 
and known hazards using available databases and the SDS information. This method is 
from the perspective of a first responder trying to decide what preventative measures 
should be used for an accident. The first thing that a first responder would look for is the 
SDS for the chemicals in a plant. The calculations have been updated for the new Global 
harmonized system, adopting their data as input and some of their characterization into 
the program. Throughout the calculations this value will be the last resort if there is no 
better information linking the data to the basic process conditions. Many other databases 
are used with the NOAA developed Chemical reactivity worksheet (CRW) program
12
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being adopted as a requirement. This program was made for first responders so it 
aggregates many different sources to display potential hazards, identifying numbers and 
some physical properties.  
CRW has a large and rather definitive classification system for chemicals based 
on their functional group and potential danger. This is valuable information that will be 
used to figure out the best way to asses a hazard as well as a last resort assessment. A 
group designation of “Halogenating agents” would tip off the program to look for 
reactive hazards and potential halogen gasses while an “Azide group” may be enough 
information to conclude explosive hazards. 
This leads to a closer look at the molecular structure of the chemicals to predict 
hazards. For this, quantitative structure activity relationship or QSAR
II
 can be used. This 
is a statistical model that combines many different descriptor variables to calculate 
various physical properties. The regression is done by calculating the properties with 
laboratory experiments and then finding the best statistical fit with the descriptors that 
they calculate. These descriptors are called molecular descriptors and are quantum 
mechanical relationships with the 3-d molecular structure of the chemical in question. 
These could be as simple as the number of nitrogen atoms or require substantial 
computing power to calculate. Basic quantities can be derived from the existence of 
functional groups, the molecular formula or the 3-D structure as shown through the 
Simplified Molecular-Input Line-Entry System or SMILES.  
The accuracy depends on the rigorousness of the model used to calculate the 
descriptors and the quality of the original equation. Many different programs can output 
the descriptors for a molecule like Toxicity Estimation Software Tool (TEST) 
13
, CheS-
Mapper 
14
, Molgen 
15
 or Chemical development kit (CDK) 
16
 with various levels of 
computational rigor. The statistical regressions are found in various academic papers and 
will be referenced as they are used in the index development. Many of the basic values 
                                                 
 
II
 QSPR is a Quantitative structure property relationship whose only difference is that the final 
result is a chemical property instead of a biological or physiological like a QSAR. This distinction will be 
dropped from here on out as QSAR will be used to refer to both.  
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are outputted automatically as a sanity check, like boiling point. The level of rigor 
required for this index matches the TEST software’s algorithms. It also automatically 
queries the EcoTox 
17
 database of reported values if available and gives a rather lengthy 
list of descriptors for literature QSAR products. Along with the fact that it is free and 
easy to use, TEST has most of the properties that are most important for this application.  
 
5.2.2 Mobility 
Mobility is the ability of the chemical to affect the party involved after loss of 
containment. The first thing to asses is the state that the chemical would be in after loss 
of containment. A simplified dispersion modeling is then done by scaling the effects 
from the chemical itself. The main input parameters involved in many dispersion models 
and mass transfer models are molecular weight and density. According to the physical 
state of the release, these variables will be transferred to indices as shown below. 
For liquids, the concern is if it is held above its boiling point, it could flash with a 
loss of containment. The fraction that is flashed (fv) is used as the descriptor value
18
. 
 
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

  Eq. 1 
 vf 1*4.0ChemMobility  Eq. 2 
All the values for mobility will be given ranges depending on the physical state 
of the chemical.
III
 Here the chemical is still in a liquid state but is allowed to have an 
upper limit of one because of the added heat due to the latent heat of vaporization that 
could cause additional problems.  
Otherwise the mobility for a liquid will be seen as a function of the volatility and 
the viscosity of the liquid. For volatility, the descriptor of choice is the equilibrium ratio 
or a K-value as shown below
19
.  
                                                 
 
III
 If not otherwise stated, the output range of all the initial value calculations is from 0 to 1 no 
matter the range of the inputs. After the value from the equation is calculated the range is applied and if it 
is outside the range than the closest limit will be the index value. 
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P
P
K ii
sat 
i  Eq. 3 
This is measuring how much the chemical wants to be in the vapor phase and is defined 
as the mole fraction in the vapor divided by the mole fraction in the liquid. To calculate 
it, a modified Raoult’s law will be used with the saturation pressure predicted from the 
Aspen regression as shown below with the index formulation.  
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Viscosity is taken in centipoise (cps) which is already weighted against water at 
20º C so its inverse relationship with mobility is given without a multiplier. The nominal 
value for the K-value is for Ethane at atmospheric pressure and 60ºC which is the 
benchmark which is set for a 0.6 dangerous level
20
. This is a non-flashing liquid so the 
range is taken from 0.2 to 0.6. 
For a gas release, the major components are going to be from diffusivity and 
dispersion modeling. The descriptor values used are molar weight (MW), and density (ρ), 
using a benign value of water and air respectfully. One factor is from the average 
velocity of rigid spheres found within diffusivity models like Chapman-Enskog. This 
adds a factor of the square root of molar weight. These models also use the mean free 
path calculation that use concentration in the form of the inverse of density 
21
. From 
dispersion modeling, buoyancy is one of most used quick sanity and plausibility checks 
that should be done before any prediction. In terms of risk to the populace or the 
workers, denser gasses allow toxins to concentrate near the surface of the earth while 
lighter gases go into the atmosphere away from affected populations. Assuming an 
instantaneous release in the Bitter-McQuaid model this factor would then use an inverse 
square root relationship with the index as shown in the factor of one half in the exponent 
in the following equation.  
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 Eq. 5 
This has the highest lower bound for mobility (0.5) because gas releases are 
inherently dangerous and is trying to assess the worst case of a dense cloud release. Here 
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g is the acceleration due to gravity and the “18 gm/mole” is from the molar weight of 
water. If the chemical is lighter than air (negative relative buoyancy), then the mobility 
value is given a value indirectly proportional to the relative buoyancy of the chemical. 
The heavier the chemical is, the situation would more likely to be dangerous, which 
requires a direct relationship the index value. The sign function returns the sign of the 
difference between the densities. Future work can include including the spherical radius 
of the chemicals from the molecular descriptors in the QSAR procedure. 
Solids get a mobility of zero unless it is a dust which would depend on it its size 
of the particles which is an area of future research. 
 
5.2.3 Fire 
For the potential for fire, the best value to use is the flash point temperature. This 
is the lowest temperature that has enough energy to cause a fire. This does not mean that 
a fire is imminent at this temperature due to the necessity of the other two parts of the 
fire triangle as well as the fact that it is a mass transfer problem to vaporize enough 
liquid to sustain a fire. There is a fire point that is also used which is the lowest 
temperature that a sustained fire can be seen. However, this parameter is for the 
chemicals’ flammability which should not have mass transfer of the solution. The 
volatility is already in the mobility parameter so there would be double counting if it 
were used here. Using the process temperature, the flash point is turned into an index 
value through the following formula from the original index
1
. 
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 Eq. 6 
A nominal value of 200 ºC for the difference between the flash and process 
temperatures is used away from the flash point for a benign value as per the previous 
index. While being at or above the flash point will be seen as a dangerous fire hazard 
and will be assigned a value of one. 
For new chemicals, the flash temperature can be predicted using ASPEN. The 
major energies at play in this process are the latent heat of vaporization, ΔHvap, and the 
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combustion energy, ΔHcomb. This can be correlated with a nondimensional form of the 
flash point. The value that is used is the boiling point which is similar to the flash point 
and is readily available, easy to predict with a QSAR and a simple experiment to set up. 
The following correlation is from Valenzuela et al.
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The next most reliable parameter is the lower flammability limit (LFL) which 
addresses the issue of amount of fuel through composition in air. This along with the 
flash point is usually reported on the SDS. If it is not reported than this can be estimated 
using the stoichiometry of the combustion reaction and an empirical formula as shown 
below
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 Eq. 8 
The stoichiometric amount of fuel (Cst) is calculated using the amount of oxygen 
molecules stoichiometrically required for the combustion reaction (z).  
The next step would be to adjust the LFL for a given temperature. LFL is a 
function of equilibrium conditions and then vary with temperature. Pressure has a small 
effect on LFL so its effect will be assumed to be constant. This has to be calculated 
experimentally but may correlations exist to relate it to other important flammability 
characteristics, like the combustion energy. The following correlation will be used for 
this index
18
.  
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The LFL at 25 ºC that was calculated or obtained earlier is LFL25 , while the 
temperature scaled version is LFLT. This can be turned into an index following the rule 
of thumb that an LFL more than 15 wt.% is near harmless. 
24 
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 Eq. 10 
The other side of the fire triangle is the amount of oxygen. The lowest 
concentration of oxygen that can cause a fire is called the lowest oxygen concentration 
or the LOC (also called the minimum oxygen concentration, MOC). This can be 
estimated from the stoichiometry again as shown below or it could be listed on the SDS 
or on an online database
18
.
LFLzLOC *  Eq. 11 
If this formula is used without a literature value for the LFL, then the reliability 
of this formula goes down since this is using the same approximation twice. This is 
transferred to an index as shown below. 
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 Eq. 12 
Anything around 25 wt.%  requires more oxygen than in air which probably 
means it is not that flammable. Below 5 wt.%  the prediction becomes unreliable so 
LOCs in this range would predict the same level of dangerous flammability.  
5.2.4 Acute toxicity 
For releases over a small time scale, inhalation is the major route of entry. The 
worry is that the exposure would overwhelm a human’s defense system. This is best 
expressed by the threshold limit value for the ceiling for concentration, TLV-C, which is 
defined as the concentration that should never be exceeded no matter the time frame of 
exposure. Most likely the SDS will have a TLV-STEL value or the short term exposure 
limit of the chemical. This is for the maximum concentration allowable over a short time 
frame of either 15 or 20 minutes. With the level of scrutiny of this index, either value 
will give the same results. There are many different sources for this information, but 
ACGIH’s values are usually the best with the ability to be easily updated and with direct 
knowledge of the experiments themselves.  
25 
Other values that can be helpful are the IDLH or the immediately dangerous to 
life and health which is compiled by NIOSH. This value was developed for respirators 
and represents the concentration that will cause irreparable harm over the long or short 
term from a single exposure. This includes irritants and asphyxiants that can prevent 
escape from dangerous environments so the value must be used carefully. All these 
values are on the same scale with the same implications and mitigations so the index 
formulation is the same. The difference is the priority of the values which should go, 
TLV-C, TLV-STEL then IDLH. 
 ppm10/log*25.01Chem 10AcuteTox IDLH  Eq. 13
The nominal value would be 10 ppm which would garner an index of 1 while a 
value at 10 % could be more deadly as a physical asphyxiant than from its toxicity so it 
gets a value of 0.  
If these values cannot be found and the only information is from a toxicology 
study in a research paper or in the SDS, the concentration where half the specimen 
where killed through inhalation, or the LD50,Inhal, can be used. Toxicology studies are 
often done with a variety of concentrations on a certain subject given a certain time that 
the subject is exposed to the substance. The time of the exposure distinguishes between 
acute effects and chronic effects as scaled to the lifecycle of the subject. The researcher 
determines the variability and confidence when extrapolating to humans diminishing the 
authority of the results. Different response variables could be used like the effective dose 
for positive attributes (ED50) or other specialty situations like the value at which 50% of 
the population has its growth inhibited, IGC50. This also comes in different percent 
values to capture more of the dynamics of the dose response curve. The approximation 
with the organism and the sometimes dubious reliability of this value leave it at the 
bottom of potential values to use.  
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This comes from classical toxicity classes that are used often to extrapolate these 
values to human exposure in a proper risk assessment
23
. The two values approximated
are a dangerous value of below 100 ppm and a nontoxic value at 10,000 ppm. 
5.2.5 Probability of a runaway reaction 
A runaway reaction starts with a reaction unexpectedly proceeding faster than 
usual. This is the initiating event that may cause other side reactions and the 
decomposition of the chemical leading to more instability. Eventually this results in a 
change in the pressure or temperature away from the design conditions. Deviations cause 
more decomposition and unwanted reactions in a positive feedback loop causing more 
instability and a medley of other harmful effects including explosion, fire and corrosion. 
The probability of the initiation event is a function of the entire mixture and is best 
assessed in the mixing factors. The probability of the chemical decomposing is a 
function of the chemical’s stability and is assessed here.  
The first check you would make would be the adiabatic temperature rise from the 
given reaction or from the energy of decomposition. Side reactions can be used if they 
are known. If the cooling shuts off or some sudden upset happens, the rise in temperature 
from the reactions can cause other reactions and more instability. If the temperature rise 
is small the mixture it would be hard for a chain reaction to happen unless the mixture 
was particularly sensitive to pressure which is often not the case. 
The next value that can be used is the auto ignition energy or the AIT. This is the 
temperature that the chemical can combust using its own kinetic energy as the ignition 
temperature. Ignition energy is a function of the stability of the molecule or the 
activation energy of the combustion reaction. The difference between this and the design 
temperature is transferred to an index like in the previous index as follows
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Just like with the flash point calculation this was made as a linear regression 
between the conditions of 200ºC away from the AIT is used as a benign value and at the 
AIT is used as a dangerous condition.  
Additionally, common functional groups that cause stress on the molecule or are 
inherently unstable, like enol or hemiacetals, are deemed to be dangerous depending on 
their number and percent of the entire molecule. This is done using the classification by 
the CRW program. The percent of atoms in such a dangerous functional group is a major 
factor since the rest of the molecule could stabilize it with its 3-D structure. In the future 
a specific QSAR relationship will be used to determine the stability of the molecule 
expanding on this thinking. 
5.2.6 Expected damage 
The damage that such a reaction could produce is a much more concrete 
parameter than the probability. Here the enthalpy of decomposition can be used to 
estimate the effect of the chemical in question. If this energy is not known, combustion 
energy and Gibbs free energy can be substituted in that order of preference. These would 
be the extensive versions derived from Hess’s law which would incorporate the amount 
of inventory in the reactor. How much of this energy will be given transferred to an 
explosion is given by the efficiency, η and will be given a nominal value of 5% 
accounting for less than ideal mixing of the gas and the inevitable loss of work due to 
conversion between thermal to mechanical energy. To access the consequences of such 
an explosion, this energy would then be compared with the equivalent mass of TNT 
using a slightly changed TNT equivalency method as shown below 
18
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 Eq. 16 
This incorporates the amount of reactive liquid in the unit but can be changed for 
the gas phase energy for explosion damage. The distance that will be used for the 
damage estimate will be 15 meters which is the minimum distance recommended by the 
CCPS of process equipment from safety equipment 
24
. This is correlated to a maximum
28 
overpressure, po, at this distance, r , using a correlation using a scaled distance as shown 
below
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The outside pressure, pa, is taken to be 1 atm and all the denominators of the 
scaled distance are in kg
1/3
/m. To translate this overpressure to an endpoint, a probit
calculation will be used for small equipment damage which is a good model for relief 
valves or emergency switches
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Half of the equipment being destroyed is taken as the dangerous value as shown 
below. This formulation and its constants will be used every time available energy is 
used or an overpressure calculated. 
%50
%
Chem AffectedExp.Damage   Eq. 20 
5.2.7 Explosion 
In the original index there was an index called “fire/explosion” that has been split 
up for this index. Right now, estimating this parameter in a quick an easy fashion is in 
fledgling state. The assessment of chemical specific explosion hazards is confined to two 
ends of the information spectrum. At one end you have cutting edge QSAR research 
using the highest order molecular descriptors that today’s computers can barely handle. 
The other end references known experience through DOT classification and in the SDS. 
29 
Probabilities of a mechanical explosion and BLEVEs will be assessed later since they 
become much clearer with an approach that is not chemical specific. 
For a chemical specific approach, physical properties will be used to classify how 
easily an explosion can develop from a fire. There are two areas that are important for 
fire propagation; the reaction front and the pressure front. The reaction front is where the 
combustion reaction happens in a fire. This moves at a rate depending on flammability 
regions and the availability of fuel in terms of mass transfer. Ahead of the reaction front, 
the pressure front is an area of high pressure caused as the reaction front pushes the 
surroundings. In fires, these fronts are far apart in space with a time delay. In an 
explosion, these two fronts are pressed on top of each other. This increases the efficiency 
of the reaction with the availability of reactants due to the pressure wave. In turn, the 
pressure wave increases drastically in overpressure due to the reaction front being more 
intense and the removal of the loss of pressure due to dissipation between the two fronts. 
The mechanics of these two fronts can be estimated to see if an explosion is a legitimate 
worry. 
The first way to do this is the relative speeds of the fronts. With some space to 
build up power, this speed can turn a regular fire into an explosion. This value done in 
isolation at standard conditions is called the fundamental burning velocity, Su , which is a 
chemical specific value. This usually comes from experiments and can be found from 
the NFPA 
26
, or from the literature 
27
 for a select number chemicals.
1
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 Eq. 21 
The velocity of propane at 45 cm/sec (rounded off from 46 cm/sec) is used as a 
safe quantity with and index value of 0. There is a big division around 90 cm/sec 
between common explosive chemicals and chemicals manufactured as explosives so it 
will be used as the dangerous value. This would give aluminum dust a 1 on the index 
while would give the threshold for “fast” burning chemicals at 60 cm/s a value of 0.33 
28
. 
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Other than speed, the energy in the explosion, ΔHExp, is a factor. How 
much drive the fire has to turn into an explosion as well as the power when it becomes 
an explosion can represent the explosibility of the chemical. This is calculated as the 
difference between the bond energies ahead of the reaction front and behind the reaction 
front. Most of the time there are more than one reaction occurring in these reaction 
fronts due to instability. The bond energies are then corrected using the available 
chemical energy. The formation of gases or prevalent side reactions can also lower this 
variables explanatory power. Availability of this variable is limited to chemical by 
chemical literature experiments and some aggregated lists 
18
. The formula to turn this
energy into an index is the same as in section 5.2.6.  
The useful bridges between the spectrum of experimental studies and quantum 
mechanical models that allow for some predictability often require careful use. Often 
research in this field is limited to one functional group or one type of bond in an effort to 
help those in the field that are handling that specific chemical. One useful relationship is 
the oxygen balance as shown below where X, Y, and Z are the number of carbon, 
hydrogen and oxygen respectfully
29
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Most explosives utilize unstable redox reactions. If the combustion reaction has 
all the oxygen atoms in the form of carbon dioxide and water in the products then you 
can say the chemical is oxygen balanced. If the reaction requires oxygen atoms on the 
reactant side than it is said to be oxygen-deficient and has a negative oxygen balance. 
The efficiency of the reaction is the greatest in oxygen balanced chemicals without the 
worry of incomplete combustion (negative oxygen balance) or dilution of the reactants 
(positive oxygen balance). This is transferred to an index as shown below. 
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This comes from the classical hazard rankings for oxygen balance with the high 
hazard region being centered on zero and asymmetrically lowers away from zero. When 
this function is sent through the constraint of values being between 0 and 1, this ranking 
is reflected. The asymmetry is because a lot of explosives have negative oxygen 
balances due to tight 3-d structure or other instabilities in their structure 
18
.
However, many chemicals like oxygen and carbon dioxide are themselves 
oxygen balanced but are inert in terms of explosion energy. This also ignores isomerism 
which could have a large effect on explosive energy. Compounds without oxygen often 
produce negative balances no matter the explosive ability. To combat these problems the 
index will only use oxygen with weak bonds, or available oxygen, and will only be 
applied when the chemical has all four of the elements, C, H, N, and O. Isomerism needs 
to be checked with a higher order QSAR function if applicable 
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.
5.2.8 Irritation 
The second most common entryway for harmful chemicals in an industrial 
environment is absorption through the skin. The best case scenario would be LD50 for a 
dermal route of entry for a rat on a 48 hour period. Some of this data can be found with 
EPAs EcoTox database 
17
, the SDS or academic papers.







ppm100
log5.01Chem
Derm,50
10Irr
LD
 Eq. 24 
This follows the same formulation as the LD50 for inhalation in section 5.2.4. 
This is because for this index, the mass transfer differences between the two routes are 
similar enough to be put on the same scale.  
In the absence of this data, pH is a good substitute using the formula from the 
original index below to capture acidic and basic substances.  
5
27pH
Chem Irr

 Eq. 25 
32 
If the substance is neutral it still can be an irritant which will be on the DOT label 
as well as on the hazards on the SDS. 
5.2.9 Chronic toxicity 
For the long term effects of exposures, the main descriptor is the Threshold limit 
value -Time weighted average (TLV-TWA). This is a measure of the maximum amount 
of exposure a worker can receive in an 8 hour work day, every day of work without 
adverse chronic effects. The best place for this would be ACIGH which updates their 
numbers regularly with new data and with changing risk attitudes. Both the values can 
usually be found on the SDS if they exist. 
 
3
log
1Chem 10ChronicTox
TWATLV 
 Eq. 26 
This comes from the idea that after 1,000 ppm the TLV-TWA value is not that 
useful because it is such a large exposure for such a long time. At this point, the constant 
loss of product is more of a worry then the health aspects. For chemicals that do not have 
this, the TEST output can generate preliminary toxicology data. 
5.2.10 Water effects 
The ecosystem of a body of water will be broken up into three different classes, 
large organisms, small organisms and bacteria scale organisms. This area of study is 
rather healthy with a large amount of toxicology studies rapidly available for many 
different exposure times and different test organisms. The variables tested in each case 
are lethal concentrations in the water, LC50 for the large organisms and small organisms 
and the inhibited growth of the bacteria, IGC50. If a plant site is known, then a 
representative from the local habitat could be used for the three different organisms. The 
organisms that are used by default to assess a wide variety of situations are Fathead 
minnow for large organisms, Daphnia magna for small organisms and Tetrahymena 
pyriformis for bacteria. The vast amount of data on this can be searched using the 
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EcoTox database but the TEST software automatically checks for experimental data 
from this database along with a QSAR estimate for the chemicals without much data
13,17
.
The predicted value for the QSAR is –log10(LC50) with the concentration in molarity 
rather than ppm so this value should be held together to preserve the regression. Below 
is the formulation for all the three values. 
 
 
5
LClog
Chem 5010effectsWater

 Eq. 27 
10
-5
 M seemed to be a reachable quantity in the local environment so it was used
as a dangerous quantity. Other important parameters that are used in these variables’ 
absence are the existence of the DOT label for aquatic hazards, the H-codes in the SDS 
and the pH. 
5.2.11 Air effects 
The air effects face the same conundrum as water effects but have a proxy 
parameter that can be consulted; chronic toxicity. Here more environmentally focused 
values can be chosen like the ERPG-2 (Emergency response planning guidelines) from 
the AIHA or the RfD (reference dose of no ill effects on an entire population) from the 
EPA from their toxicity fact sheets. 
  






ppm5
2-ERPG
log3/11Chem 10effectsAir Eq. 28 
   RfDlog3/11Chem 10effectsAir  Eq. 29 
The difference between these two values is that the ERPG is the concentration in 
the air that could cause a harmful effect on the population measured in ppm while the 
RfD is a dose per weight of the person for a specific time period that above which would 
cause harmful effects to the population, measured in mg/kg/day. The overall formulation 
comes from the chronic toxicity from air in section 5.2.9. Since the concentration would 
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have to be higher to end up being a threat to a whole population, a factor of 1/5 is given 
to the ERPG to put it on the same scale while the RfD would be on the same order of 
magnitude because of the use of dose.  
Dispersion effects that were not a large factor for the danger to workers, take 
over in this setting because exposure to the public is on a different time and length scale. 
Here variables like the density of buildings around the plant or the wind patterns can be 
used in the future to get an estimate the hazards of a gas exposure. 
5.2.12 Solid effects 
This will be done on a case by case basis if there are significant solid hazards to 
the environment. The first concern is in particle size being in the range to pass through a 
human’s lung cavities and get to the alveoli at around 5-10 micrometers. This is also 
small enough to pass through many of the environment’s filtration systems like soil 
sedimentation.  
5.2.13 Bioaccumulation 
Up until now, the index was focused on the toxin’s effect on the environment. 
The environment has many processes to regulate toxic substances, clean itself out and 
intensify certain chemicals. The ability of the chemical to evade these processes can be 
dangerous by itself. The next two parameters tries to take into account the relative 
amount and the time scale that the toxin is in the environment. One can imagine a 
situation where some chemical is released in a lake at a relatively harmless level. The 
chemical is absorbed in the kelp to the point where the kelp has a higher concentration. 
A fish eats the kelp and over time, the concentration in its body goes beyond his 
threshold level and it begins to destroy its organs. The concentration in the water is still 
below the level of organ failure but the chemical increased concentration through the 
food cycle. This was a big problem during the DDT pesticide epidemic as the DDT was 
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sprayed right below the point of irreparable damage but it accumulated through the food 
cycle and destroyed many ecosystems. 
There are two parts to this phenomenon; the increase in concentration through 
the food chain (biomangnification) and the increase in concentration due to intake and 
storage of a prolonged release (bioconcentration). The first factor is a function of the 
local ecosystem which for now is set to be constant. To quantify bioconcentration, a 
mass balance is done on an organism. The inlet is from respiration and absorption, the 
output is secretion and the consumption is the metabolism of the organism. An inlet of 
food and water is a part of the biomangnification problem formulation which is set to be 
constant. A low bioaccumulation potential would be if the outlet concentration is close 
to the inlet. Bioconcentration factor (BCF) is defined as the ratio between the 
concentrations inside and outside the organism at steady state. This can either be from a 
real study in the ecosystem of choice, or predicted from a QSAR procedure. This factor 
often is not found unless it is a major pollutant, but the QSAR procedure is simple with 
the TEST software 
13
.
  1log*5.0Chem 10Bioacc  iBCF Eq. 30 
Some absorption will happen but classical interpretations on BCF is that having a 
BCF >5000 is the tipping point for dangerous propagation that will surely increase with 
biomangnification. To allow for even more toxic substances in the specialty industry it 
will be given a value of around 0.85 which results in the simple 0.5 factor out front with 
the subtraction by one to get rid of the inaccurate yet benign range below a log10 (BCF) 
of two 
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Another value that can be used is the octanol water partition coefficient or Kow. 
This is the ratio of the concentration of the chemical across a water octanol liquid-liquid 
interface. The absorption through a diffusion process between water and a substitute for 
plant matter (Octanol) can gain insights on how the chemical accumulates through 
equilibrium process. The problem is that it is highly affected by the solubility of the 
chemical and that such an equilibrium process does not represent the living organism 
interacting with the environment. This value simplifies the mass balance by assuming 
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the metabolism is not a worry. However, some chemicals are not metabolized well in 
organisms which would show up in the BCF but not with the Kow. The advantage to 
using the Kow is that the experiment can be easily setup in a lab and can gain valuable 
insights into the system. There is also a major effort to find a sensible relationship 
between the BCF and Kow. This can also be estimated using the TEST software but this 
value would be the least reliable. 
  5.1log*5.0Chem ow10Bioacc  K  Eq. 31
This follows the same explanation as the BCF but with more uncertainty in the 
lower end which leads to the 1.5 subtraction. 
5.2.14 Degradation 
This parameter looks at how long a chemical remains in the environment after 
the exposure. How much it naturally degrades and how much the environment can 
degrade it are the two prominent factors determining degradation. If it does not degrade, 
then it can affect more ecosystems by passing through various natural cycles or transport 
systems (rivers). The primary variable is the chemical’s persistency which is the half-life 
of a chemical tested in an environment. This variable depends heavily on the local 
environment so future work is to incorporate local soil types and algae that can or cannot 
break down the chemical. This info can be found with a search in the EcoTox database 
which has many studies and predicted persistency measurements from academia and 
practice 
17
. The other value of note is half-life which only studies half of the problem at
hand. If these values are not available they can be estimated from the TEST software 
13
.
These are then turned into an index as shown below. 
 yPersistenclog*5.0Chem 10nDegredatio  Eq. 32 
 2/110nDegredatio log*5.0Chem t Eq. 33 
The reasoning behind the numbers is linked to the timescale of ecological 
processes. The water cycle is a main source of natural cleaning and degradation by 
having the toxins in the soil exposed to microbes, physical separation through a packed 
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“column”, and time for it to degrade on its own. Many times the age of wells range from 
dozens of days and then quickly drops off to months and years. The older the well the 
cleaner and safer the source is from pollutants. If a chemical degrades on the timescale 
of then it could get into our water supply and the water supply of other animals 
31
. To
make it simple 100 days was chosen by Koller et al. for a dangerous property and 10 
resulting in a multiplier of one half 
1
.
5.3 Secondary effects method, Sec.Eff,  parameter-parameter interactions 
The parameters themselves could have effects on other parameters like a fire 
leading to an explosion resulting in higher values for both. Additionally some of the 
information about the chemicals may not be captured with just the chemical values like 
toxicity values stipulating one mode of intake. This is when the Secondary effects 
method is used to make the Effective Dangerous Properties (EDP) as shown below. 
Design variables in this stage do not have that much sway over these methods so they 
are considered the chemical specific methods. 
chempara,chempara,chempara, SecEffIntValEDP   Eq. 34 
This method is the result of the original index’s fate index. The main driving 
force for the inclusion of this correction was to assess how the party is exposed after a 
loss of containment. Partially this is covered by the mobility parameter, which tries to 
assess the chemicals’ path and time scale after loss of containment. The other part of the 
equation is how much of the parameter gets transferred to the party exposed. Health data 
often requires this extra step because of the dependency on mode of exposure (inhalation 
as opposed to ingestion) as well as the classification of carcinogens. Mathematically, the 
way to represent this is with an if-then statement specifying the mode of transfer or 
specific release scenario. What is missing from the equation is then parameter-parameter 
interaction.  
When something like explosion and fire hazards exist together it is a more 
dangerous situation since one can cause the other. This can be modeled with an “And” 
gate or certain parameters multiplied together. This requires a perspective looking at all 
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the parameters and the body of initial process safety information. This means it should 
exist as an additive factor applied on a chemical basis. Table 2 shows all the secondary 
effects used currently.  
This factor does not have the explanatory power of a dangerous property at an 
index value of 1. This is a modifier for extra, exclusively dangerous information so its 
range will be from 0 to 0.5. The maximum of 0.5 should be given for a combination of 
two properties with an index value of 1 which results in a multiplier of 0.5 as shown 
below. 
Raw
chempara,chem para, SecEff*5.0SecEff  Eq. 35 
Table 2. The formulas and explanations for the secondary effects 
Parameter Secondary Effect Reasoning 
1 Mobility 0 - 
2 Fire Mobility*Fire More areas that can be in a 
flammability region 
3 Acute Toxicity 1.25*Mobility*Acute 
Toxicity  
How quick the path from release 
to the workers  is traversed greatly 
affects the danger (hence 1.25) 
4 Probability of 
runaway 
Expected Damage* Prob. 
of Runaway 
risk = consequence * probability 
5 Expected Damage Expected Damage* Prob. 
of Runaway 
risk = consequence * probability 
6 Explosion Mobility * Explosion More areas that can be in an 
explosibility range 
7 Irritation Mobility* Irritation Larger affected area on the victim 
and the mode of transport between 
the loss of containment and the 
victim 
8 Chronic Toxicity 1.25*Mobility*Chronic 
Toxicity 
How quick the path from release 
to the workers  is traversed greatly 
affects the danger (hence 1.25) 
9 Water effects WaterEff * Bioacc * 
Degrad 
Environmental consequences are 
affected by the chemicals ability 
to “survive” in the environment.  
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10 Air effects AirEff * Bioacc * Degrad Environmental consequences are 
affected by the chemicals ability 
to “survive” in the environment. 
11 Solid effects 0 - 
12 Bioaccumulation 0 - 
13 Degradation 0 - 
5.4 Mixed method, Mix, chemical-chemical interactions 
When collapsing the chemicals an assumption is used that there are no 
interactions between the different chemicals. This is checked by the Mix method which 
goes through the interactions between all the chemicals in the solution. The equations 
that make up Mix is a combination of parsing the output of the chemical reactivity 
worksheet, some mixed versions of the chemical equations, and dedicated models for 
interaction effects. As opposed to binary interactions, the preferred version of the 
equations used is solution based. This is done because binary interactions model a 
situation that does not exist in reality just like the previous methods. When this is added 
to the previous step it becomes the Mixed Dangerous Properties (MDP).  
para
Chem
chempara,para Mix  EDP*  MDP  

w Eq. 36 
Where the w is the chosen weights for this aggregation either best case, worse case or an 
average. User weights can also be supplied and inserted here if more control is needed.  
5.4.1 Mobility 
An indicator of how much interaction a mixture will have in dispersion modeling 
or diffusion is with the molecular weight. For many formulas, an influential input 
variable is molecular weight. If a mixture had similar molecular weights, they would not 
interact that much since these equations would see them as the same situation. Molecular 
Table 2. Continued. 
Parameter Secondary Effect Reasoning 
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weight is also linearly related to the spherical radius of the molecule which is another 
important input variable.  
This will be benchmarked against a hypothetical mixture with the same number 
of components all having a molecular weight of water. This mixture would be the easiest 
to disperse after a loss of contamination cause its small size and lack of interactions.  
1
gm/mol18
1
MixMobility 


numChem
MWChems i  Eq. 37 
Here the subtraction of 1 centers the index on 0 for a case that is as devoid of 
interaction as a mixture of water.  
5.4.2 Fire 
One idea for this mixing factor is to incorporate the fire triangle. In terms of the 
probability of a fire, the ignition energy will be assumed to be present because there are 
so many ignition sources in a chemical plant. The existence of an oxidizer with a fuel 
can be disastrously dangerous while the existence of an inert agent or excess water can 
decrease the flammability. This is quantified by the existence of different groups using 
the CRW classification scheme. Their effect is weighted by their theoretical mole 
fraction in the vapor phase since combustion happens in the vapor phase. 
   
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 Chem Chem 
Fire OxidizerB**fuelB**2Mix ii yy  Eq. 38 
The function B returns a Boolean value (0 for no and 1 for yes) for the given type 
of chemical. As it exist now, the index only predicts dangerous situations so the range of 
values are from 0 to 0.5 where .5 is where the entire vapor space is filled with half 
oxidizer and half fuel. This value is the worst possible situation and so the factor of 2 is 
out front to scale this dangerous value to 0.5. In the future the effect of water in the 
vapor phase will be added in to so a beneficial situation. 
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This introduces another problem with the LFL formulation. A fire is a 
combustion reaction in the vapor phase, so the only thing that matters is the vapor mole 
fraction of fuel and not the individual components in the liquid phase. A mixture LFL is 
then the amount of this fuel that is necessary to cause a fire and is calculated with Le 
Chatelier’s equation as shown below. 



Chem
Mix
1
i
i
LFL
y
LFL   Eq. 39 
wt%30
5.0Mix mixFire
LFL
  Eq. 40 
First the mole fraction is on a combustible basis or with only the combustible 
values included. This is already modified using the activity coefficient as calculated in 
Aspen. Translating this to an index comes from the regular index translation from the 
initial value version for LFL. The difference is that it is halved due to it being an additive 
factor. The reason that this is not used instead of the initial values is because of the 
assumptions used in this equation’s proof. It assumes constant heat capacity, combustion 
kinetics for a chemical are the same as in the mixture and that the adiabatic temperature 
rise for all the components in the mixture are the same. This decreases its reliability to 
the point where it cannot be used as evidence to explain the full range of the index let 
alone explaining the fire hazards by itself. This is a reason why it is also an additive 
factor so it can be easily turned off and adjusted independently of the rest of the index. 
These assumptions can be partially tested for a mixture and the deviations can be 
quantified within the mix index. If one of the assumptions is wrong that throws off other 
calculations in this section since these are the fundamentals behind fires. Many mixture 
correlations for this field try to marry the complex interaction between the different 
kinetics of the reaction with the thermodynamic changes. The formulation often uses 
Boiling point as a baseline with adjustments using chemical equilibrium, molecular 
structure and/or heats of reaction 
32
. An effective heat of combustion can be calculated 
by weighting it with the mass fraction in the vapor phase using an activity adjusted 
Raoult's law. If this is correlated alone this can be used to isolate the effects of the heat 
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of reaction and chemical equilibrium from the effect of the different adiabatic 
temperatures and changes of heat capacities that are of a different nature
18
.  
%100*
kcal/mol2.11
Chem
burn,
Mix

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ii Hy
LFL  Eq. 41 
Without this index, the LFLs would be simply averaged or the worst case 
scenario would be used. The effect of these assumptions can be gauged with the average 
case to see how much of a worry the assumptions are.  
 
%wt5
mean
Mix chemmixFire
iLFLLFL   Eq. 42 
A change of 5 wt% in the LFL would signify a major breach of the assumptions 
which would throw off the previous calculations. This formulation allows aggregation of 
the Chem with Mix to follow the same arithmetic as the analytical formulas with the 
ability to change their impact with the human assessment of the data sources. 
5.4.3 Toxicity 
The same principle for fires applies to both toxicity measurements. The thing that 
matters for a human’s defense mechanism is the relative amount of toxins that it has to 
filter. In this way we have the idea of overexposure using a similar formula as the Le 
Chatelier’s equation.  



Chem
ppm500/
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i
i
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 Eq. 43 
Here a value over one is said to be an overexposed worker and not in compliance 
with the given regulation or recommendation. Normally, the 500 would not be there but 
this is a scaling factor for the concentration that a worker is exposed to given the 
concentration in the unit. This procedure can be done with most toxicity measures except 
the LD50 data. As a correction factor this will be centered on zero and halved with the 
formulation below. 
 1-Exposure*5.0MixTox    Eq. 44 
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The subtraction is to center the value on the regulation. The 0.5 is due to the 
using calculated values and the conversion from unit concentration to exposure.  
 
5.4.4 Probability of a runaway reaction 
As we can now see all the chemicals and their relative amounts, the likelihood of 
an initiating event for a runaway can be assessed. If all the reactions were known a 
combination of the kinetics and thermodynamics could be used to rack the potential for a 
runaway reaction. Here the amount of reactants needed, resilience of the reaction to the 
presence of other chemicals or situations as well as the amount product gas produced per 
reactant and other secondary properties could be measured for the whole set of reactions 
that could possibly occur using all the possible chemicals and concentrations that could 
be present. The result would include a list of specific sensitive properties that can be 
tracked and controlled in the next design phase rather than after a HAZOP review.  
This ideal can toned down so it can be realized thanks to molecular predictions 
and software packages like the Chemical Reactivity Worksheet (CRW)
12
. This program 
is a simplified, repurposed and free version of the CHEETAH
33
 program that estimates 
potential reactions and their thermodynamics using the Benson method. This is not a full 
molecular model like a QSAR model but breaks the molecule into significant parts. 
Partially this breaks down along functional group lines with the other division being 
along weak, reactive or structurally important bonds. The thermodynamic effects and 
contributions of these fragments are used to calculate things like Gibbs free energy of 
formation and heat of combustion. These can be done using ASPEN’s property 
estimation techniques for lower temperatures while this is useful till 1500ºC. Applied to 
reactions, this approach can be used to estimate the Arrhenius factor and activation 
energy as well as heat of reaction. The CRW conduit allows for the batch checking of a 
mixture for such reactions. The output is translated into two main categories for negative 
outcomes: immediate reactivity hazards and evolved gasses. For reactivity hazards, 
things like corrosivity, heat generation and explosive ability is assessed while the 
potential gases produced during a reaction are compiled for a reaction pair. 
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To turn this into a mixing factor these need to be transferred to the program in a 
way that is consistent with the index as a whole. The index will see the CRW results 
through a procedurally generated output report file outlining the documentation and the 
immediate results of the test. These are compiled by CRW into large categories of 
“compatible”, “caution” and “not compatible”. However, this will not be used since the 
documentation itself can give more insight and a larger range of values. There are two 
different pieces of information that will be lifted from the text files; the chemical 
reactivity and the potential released gases. Each of these will be stored in the form of a 
half triangular matrix with the rows and columns being the list of all the chemicals in the 
entire plant. To compute the final value they will be summed up as follows: 
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  Eq. 45 
The two summations are targeting all the chemical pairs that exist in that one 
unit. This is divided by the number of pairs to get an average value of items. The 
expected value of items for an innocuous pairing was determined to be 0.1 due to the 
inclusion of items that are only applicable at unstable conditions. This was done by a 
qualitative look at the chemical database but a future quantitative statistical survey can 
be done.  
 To create the master matrix for the Reaction and gas matrixes, the items in each 
of the pairs’ reports are summed up. For chemical hazards the number is multiplied by 
the severity of the language used. If an item has words like “Intense” and “Explosive” 
For the hazards guidewords that are used like “Intense”, will augment the items in the 
report. For the gas matrix, each potential produced gas will give a nominal value of 0.1. 
The value of one pair cannot exceed 0.5 due to unstable mixtures often outputting 
matches at extreme conditions.  
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5.4.5 Explosion 
One way to check the mixture properties for explosions is through a mixture 
burning velocity. Usually the fundamental burning velocity is found by changing the 
composition of fuel and air to get different flame speeds. The most efficient burning is at 
the stoichiometric amount of fuel to air. How close the fuel to air mixture is to this value 
is normalized as the equivalence ratio. This is done on a mass basis as shown below. 
 
Optoxidizerfuel
oxidizerfuel
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   Eq. 46 
The amount of fuel follows a parabolic shape with the burning velocity with the 
peak being around the stoichiometric ratio. To take the fundamental burning velocity and 
change it according to the given equivalence ratio is a useful correlation. This is done 
through the temperature and pressure dependence exponent as shown below 
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.  
 
 



sign*0.5
oo
ou,u
*17.0
1*375.0783.1
*















P
P
T
T
SS
 Eq. 47 
The nominal value of temperature and pressure, To, Po, are the conditions that the 
database value of the burning velocity was measured in. Either this will be user inputted 
from the specific data source or they will be assumed to be standard conditions. The 
initial formula is often used in studies to find the specific alpha and beta for their 
specific system. This is just a correlation for the effect of the equivalence ratio when in 
reality it depends on many equipment specific factors. To see the mixture effects, this 
formula is enough.  
To make a mixture burning velocity the individual velocities will be weighted by 
their composition in the vapor phase after adjusting for temperature and pressure. The 
optimal fuel to air ratio is chemical specific because the chemical would burn better if 
the air was stoichiometric for their specific combustion reaction. To see how the mixture 
should affect the velocity and to use the most conservative value, the mixture fuel to air 
ratio of a hypothetical release will be the optimal for the mixture. This will be calculated 
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using a hypothetical fuel with all the chemicals that could be fuels being treated as one 
chemical.  
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 Eq. 48 
The subscripts on alpha and beta are from the change in equivalence ratio with 
the changing optimum fuel ratio. This is turned into a mixing index as follows. 
 
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mean
Mix
uchemmixu,
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  Eq. 49 
This comes from applying the slope from the equation for the chemical specific 
burning velocity as shown in section 5.2.7 to the change in the burning velocity due to 
mixing. Hopefully this will assess how each chemical is affected by the other in terms of 
inerting and the changes in process conditions.  
As a mixture, the explosion hazard that can be assessed is a BLEVE or Boiling 
liquid expanding vapor explosion. Heating or a loss of pressure may cause the liquid to 
start to boil. With a large change in heat capacity of the liquid and gas state the vessel 
begin to weaken as the pressure of the vapor grows. The latent heat of vaporization and 
the increased pressure causes more boiling in a positive feedback loop. Eventually a 
rupture occurs in the vessel and can cause an explosion. This can be better assessed here 
with the ability to look at the mixed properties. 
The liquid is flashing up in a BLEVE do to the design pressure or a decreased 
pressure due to expansion or a loss of containment. Using a system with one mole of the 
mixture and solving the component mass balance comes to the following equation. The 
definition of the K-value is used as y/x as well as the physical limitation that the 
summation of the vapor mole fraction has to equal one 
19
.  
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 Eq. 50 
The value of fv can be found through a root finding procedure or iteration through 
guess and check to get the value for the mixture. The new amount in the vapor phase can 
be found using the old amount added to this amount vaporized. This results in a new 
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pressure that can be found with the ideal gas law or using the compressibility factor. The 
energy that would be released if this were allowed to expand isothermally is shown 
below. An isothermal expansion is chosen because it is the most conservative estimate 
and the process can be assumed to be fast.  







0
Flash
Flash ln
P
P
VPE   Eq. 51 
  1kJ24/log*9.0Mix 10Explosion  E  Eq. 52 
This value comes from doubling the range of available energy in section 5.2.6 and then 
centering the value on zero.  
 
5.5 Vessel method, Vessel, unit-process interactions 
5.5.1 Overview 
The solution is then placed in a process unit that has an assumption that it will 
never break down or lose containment. The Vessel method goes through a risk 
assessment for a loss of containment in each of the scenarios outlined by the parameters. 
This looks at the perspective of the maintenance personnel trying to understand which 
units would need more care due to the physical makeup of the unit as well as the process 
in the unit. A main addition to this area is the model alteration capability. This allows a 
designer to add things into the design that is not captured in the ASPEN design. These 
will be assessed in terms of their effect on the detection capabilities of the system, the 
failure rate or mitigation of the parameters directly. This system is flexible enough to 
cover everything from process control to end of the pipe technologies to more rugged 
material of construction. 
The final Vessel will be calculated by using a risk criticality index
36
. This falls 
under the idea of an increasing model complexity as the index reaches its final stages. 
The index combines the consequence analysis with the frequency of the event and how 
often it will be detected as follows.  
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eConsequenc*Detection *LossContVessel   Eq. 53 
The probability of a loss of containment (PLossCmt) will be an adjusted failure rate 
from a nominal failure rate for every ASPEN model. It will be adjusted like a unit 
conversion calculation with the base failure rate having units of “standard process 
conditions” and “without any alterations”. The formula to get this is as follows. 
processmodelBaseLossCmt * fffP   Eq. 54 
To turn this final failure rate in units of hr-1into a unitless additive factor, a logarithmic 
scheme is used with a dangerous failure rate of 1*10-2 hr-1 and a benign failure rate of 
1*10-5 hr-1. 
 510 10*log
3
1
LossCont f   Eq. 55 
The extremity of the process conditions will be assessed in Δfprocess while the model 
alterations effect on failure rate will be assessed in Δfmodel. The detection will be filled 
with nominal values for each parameter that can be adjusted by a model alteration. The 
consequence value will incorporate the consequence analysis from previous methods as 
well as the model alterations assessed in this method as shown below. 
 
5.5.2 Process extremity 
Extreme process conditions can cause fatigue in control systems and physical 
fatigue in the unit. To account for this deviation the effects of the most relevant process 
conditions, temperature and pressure, will be multiplied together to find the overall 
effect for the process. 






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





P
P
T
T ValValf

^10^10Process  Eq. 56 
Overall, this formulation is trying to make a linear line on a log scale by using the 
dangerous amount and quantity as second point with the ambient conditions. This allows 
the effects to be multiplied together into a value that is naturally centered on 1 and 
bounded at zero. For a unit conversation type of calculation, this is perfect and 
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interchangeable with more advanced fatigue models. More or less, this has been the 
procedure for the other indices but it has to be given a procedural process here due to the 
maximum failure rate changing with the function of the unit as designated by the unit’s 
class. The exponent is normalizing a key variable for fatigue in the unit. Val comes from 
the model in particular and tau is how much of a dangerous quantity of that variable 
would change the failure rate.  
For temperature, the model used is the distance away from an ambient 
temperature of 25ºC. Each direction has its own maximum value to account for the 
greater effect of cryogenic temperatures on systems. For positive Val, the maximum is 
600ºC corresponding which would put the temperature of 500ºC as the threshold for 
dangerous quantities at an index value of 0.8. For negative Val, the maximum is set to 
125ºC corresponding to a process temperature of -100ºC, which is when there may be a 
significant amount of solids is something were to fail. 
 TTValT  C25,C25max  Eq. 57
For pressure the variable used is the isothermal expansion of the contents of the 
units. This equation was used during the BLEVE calculations in section 5.4.5. Like 
before the isothermal expansion is used because it is the most conservative out of other 
methods like thermodynamic availability or adiabatic expansion. The difference in this 
formulation is that the expansion is between the design pressure and the atmospheric 
pressure. The maximum value differs for vacuum and pressurized vessels with 1000 kJ 
for a vacuum and 1000 mJ for any other vessel
18
.
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
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P
PVValP  Eq. 58 
The tau in Eq. 56 is the slope of the regression which can be found by the two failure 
rates and maximum value, ValMax, which is defined by the model used. The two failure 
rates are the base failure rate, fBase, and the maximum failure rate, fMax. Below is the 
formulation for the tau of the process condition.  
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

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 Eq. 59 
The base failure rate is defined by the APSEN model selected. In some models this is 
defined by a design parameter like compressors’ failure rate being defined by the 
horsepower requirement. The maximum failure rate for temperature and pressure is 
defined similarly using a few process conditions. The maximum failure rate for pressure 
is 5*10
-6
/hr for pressurized vessels (Pa>2atm). A reactor would have a failure rate for
50*10
-6
/hr for temperature and will be treated as a pressurized vessel for pressure. If
these conditions are not met, than the maximum failure rate is 100*10
-6
/hr.
The caveat to these calculations is that they are only for certain parameters. It 
does not make sense to do the calculations for a loss of containment when the scenario 
checked by the parameter does not depend on a loss of containment. An obvious 
example of this is Mobility that tests the distance and ease for the “hazard” to reach 
people or the community after loss of containment. In its definition, it is assumed a loss 
of containment already happened so testing for it would not be fair and would ultimately 
lead to double counting the different effects. The full list of calculations is shown in 
Table 4.  
5.5.3 Model alterations 
The idea of capturing data from vague ideas about what should be is at the 
forefront of incorporating all the information available and customizing an output to the 
designers’ needs. A wide variety of needs, an incredibly low amount of hard numbers 
and a requirement for the adjustments to be able to swing risk assessments by orders of 
magnitude requires something different than the other methods’ calculations.  
To deal with this, a semi-quantitative risk assessment using a rubric is done on 
each of the proposed enhancements. First, the alteration is classified in how it helps the 
system in terms of changing the failure rate, detection or the mitigation of an event. This 
determines the goal of the unit and mathematically shows the program where to use the 
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result. It is then classified into the specific parameters or the dangerous conditions it 
protects against. For the maximum values, it would either affect the maximum 
temperature in determining the process extremity or the maximum pressure. For 
Detection and Consequence, these values effects one or more of the parameters. The 
designer then evaluates the system using a ranking scheme and a rubric in the categories 
of strength, maintainability, and reliability. This value is ubiquitous for many different 
types of systems so it is called Usefulness as shown below. 
ilityMaintainab *yReliabilit*Strength   Usefulness  Eq. 60 
Strength is defined as how effective the equipment will be in the given task. Will it 
actually mitigate the effects of a fire or will it just warn of impending danger? Reliability 
is defined as how often someone has to repair or replace the system. Maintainability is 
defined here to be the ease of this repair or replacement in terms of amount of expertise 
required, length of down time, ease of acquiring the new parts and how easy it would be 
to access the part. These values get a value of 1 for an unhelpful situation and a 5 given 
for complete delivery of the definitions. The rubric is as shown below in Table 3. 
Table 3. Rubric for assigning alteration usefulness values 
Score Strength Reliability Maintainability 
1 Temp. relief or 
notification 
MTTF ~1 
month 
Shutdown on order of months / esoteric 
parts / cramped quarters 
5 State of the art 
control 
MTTF ~5 
years 
Quick turnaround/ ubiquitous parts / 
easy access 
This introduces a wealth of possibilities for the types of systems that can be 
included. An inherently safer solution would have the benefit of having high scores for 
maintainability and reliability but it still has to do its job. Alternatively, if the problem 
can be easily solved with another material of construction or a thicker hull, the system 
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would be able to see this in the same formulation. This area highlights how every 
method can be approached using an inherently safer approach or through a system level 
risk reduction point of view. 
To translate this to an index value, one section was given for free with a useful 
value of 125 and a useless value of 1 which are simply the numerical bounds of the 
ranking system. This index is called Armor% because it is taken as a protection system 
while a value of 1 would mean total protection. 
 
 125log
Usefulnesslog
Armor%
10
10
mode   Eq. 61 
The area that this armor protects against is determined by the initial 
characterization of its mode. There are four ways that an alterations can impact a unit; 
max, base, detection or consequence. Max is the maximum failure rate due to extreme 
processes, specified further as an extreme temperature or an extreme pressure or both. 
Base covers protections on the overall failure rate in normal operations. Both of these 
affect their respected failure rates in the same way as shown below, 
  o*Armor%1 ff    Eq. 62
where fo is the original failure rate from the aspen model whether it be base, max 
temperature or max pressure. 
Detection and mitigation can be applied to any of the parameters or multiple 
parameters and protects against values used in the overall Vessel risk assessment. A 
maximum value of 0.5 reduction in one parameter is allowed because it should not have 
a larger extent than a regular index since it is only fix and not necessarily fixing the 
inherent problem. One model should not be related or required for another model’s 
execution. However, there are some small exceptions. The first one was in the SecEff 
that was dependent on the Chem. values and the Consequence calculation is another. The 
alteration directly changes the hazards calculated in the previous section by definition. 
This is what a user would think adding a stronger hull would do which far outweighs 
model purity. To help with model purity, the value to be used is the chemical hazards 
with a simple average of the chemicals. The thing that is important for this stage would 
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be the presence or absence of that hazard to be mitigated so this is done with a boolean 
check on a nominal value of 0.05 index units. The results are shown below. 
  Parachem avgParaPara Armor% *0.5 - 05.0ChemB  eConsequenc   Eq. 63 
Detection tests the administrative and process controls of a plant. If a designer 
thinks that a process will be easy to control or that the company will be moving their 
best talent to the job site, they can adjust for a better detection score. This is done in the 
same vein as Consequence as shown below. 
Para
Base
para
Adj.
para Armor%*5.0DetectDetect  Eq. 64 
The difference is in the base values which are now set as a nominal value instead of an 
average of previous results. These nominal values are posited values that are said to be 
representative of an average process control system and administrative protocols as 
shown in Table 4. For the base detection, a nominal value of 0.3 was given for 
composition monitoring it can be found out pretty easily with flow and space time in a 
reactor. The other parameters were adjusted to this base value by how easy it is to detect 
compared to composition. 
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Air Effects LossCont 0.3 
Solid effects LossCont 0.7 
Bioaccumulation LossCont 0.3 
Degradation  LossCont 0.3 
Table 4. The parameter dependence on the Vessel calculations  
Parameter LossCont Base Detection 
Mobility 1 0.2 
Fire LossCont 0.4 
Acute Toxicity LossCont 0.3 
Probability of runaway 1 0.1 
Expected Damage 1 0.5 
Explosion LossCont 0.2 
Irritation 1 0.3 
Chronic Toxicity 1 0.2 
Water effects LossCont 0.3 
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5.6 Hot spot method, HotSpot, changing conditions’ effect 
Up until now, one condition was used in to assess all the methods. For a reactor, 
a litany of properties is changing and some chemicals may even be emerging from the 
solution. These dynamics need to be captured by the system to accurately judge a unit 
over whole length of the unit. This is done in the method, HotSpot that redoes the index 
(up until a CDP) for the different conditions found in an along the length of the unit. The 
variables that are changed are the ones that the function of the unit changes. A heater is 
designed to change the temperature of the process so Temperature and all other variables 
that change with temperature will be available for the iteration. The locations that are 
available for iteration are called “Spots” and are the inlet and outlet areas as well as a 
spot in the middle or a representative spot for an average or steady state value. A safety 
expert would try to use this last value in detailed calculations. Taking the error between 
this calculation and if the safety expert explicitly took the conditions at all the inlet and 
outlets into account results in the HotSpot quantity as shown below. This evaluates the 
effect of taking into consideration the changing conditions along the length of the unit 
which was an assumption that was in place throughout the previous calculations. In the 
future, more conditions could be tracked and more middle points could be examined. 
 
   
 statesteady or  avgCDP
Vars changing*Spots
 varchangingSpot,CDP
HotSpot
Vars Changing Spots
para
para
para
numnum

 
 
Eq. 65 
This is done one condition at a time, keeping the rest of the values at the nominal value. 
This method is added to the CDP to become the final unit-dependent value, named Unit 
Dangerous Properties (UDP).  
5.7 Unit-unit interactions, Unit-Unit 
The units are collapsed with the assumption that the units are not affected by 
each other. This is tested in the method Unit-Unit that tries to take the perspective of a 
HazOp team evaluating upset conditions. There are two parts of this problem: process 
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control and abnormal event mitigation. Both are shown in Figure 2 as the model 
generates different upsets using HazOp methodology and then assess how well the 
downstream units handle the upset. To pick a scenario a variable (currently T,P,F) and 
guidewords (currently more and less) are chosen. The guide word is given a multiplier 
integer (-1 for less, etc.) and the deviation is calculated.  
Figure 2. The model of an upset condition for the Unit-Unit interaction calculation 
is shown. The slashed lines represent a change in the stream while the bold lines 
indicate an increase in flow. A clear background represents the normal conditions, 
diagonal lines represent a full upset throughout the unit and the grid represents a 
partial upset. 
This deviation value is the expected propensity of fluctuations in the conditions 
at the inlet of the upset unit. This can be inferred from the failure rate data, which is 
already estimated by the upstream unit’s Vessel average value. This brings upset 
formulation from the realm of painful enumeration in real time in front of a group of 
thinly bound group of professionals to automatic and arguable science. This is done as 
the deviation amount for the variable of choice as shown below.  
Upset 
(S1, More, Flow)
S1
S2
U1
U2
U0
15 min10 min5 min
U3
S3Dev = meanpara( VesselU0 )
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  1unit para VesselmeanDev 
 Eq. 66 
The resulting 15 minute upset (from RMP regulations) will be calculated and the 
all the conditions of the downstream unit could potentially change. If the downstream 
unit has a residence time that is smaller than 15 minutes, the upset continues to the next 
unit. The calculated process conditions at the outlet of the first upsetted unit travels to 
the next unit as an upset. This continues until the 15 minutes are finished or the upset 
recycles back on itself. Formulaically, Unit-Unit will be the summation of all the units’ 
difference between the upset conditions and the normal conditions. Effectively this is 
only relevant for those units that are directly upsetted by the upset. This can be used as a 
measure of the robustness of the system to an upset in that stream. 
   


Units
vg,s,,,, normalCDPUpsetCDPUUval
xUnit
para
xUnit
paraparavgs Eq. 67 
This is done for all the guidewords, g (currently more and less) and all variables, 
v (currently T,P,F). This will be averaged together to get the final Unit-Unit value for 
each of the parameters in that stream, s, as shown below. 
   vnumgnum
g v
paravgs
para
*
UUval
UnitUnit
,,,
 
  Eq. 68 
This is done for all the streams in the plant and aggregated together when the unit 
dimensions is collapsed. Once this is added to the combined version of UDP, the 
dangerous property is said to be representative of a system wide approach to the plant 
and is said to be an Integrated Dangerous Properties (IDP). 
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6 APPLICATIONS*
6.1 Case study description 
The index was applied to a 550 million pounds per year dimethyl ether (DME) 
production facility from shale gas design. The flowsheet and simulation results are based 
on recent research work by Karagöz 
37
. The ASPEN Plus flowsheet is shown in Figure 3.
This can be taken as a cutting edge, grassroots design that would have taken a HazOp 
team or a safety expert longer to understand and go through. 
Figure 3. The PFD for the DME production plant used as a case study for the IEHS 
index
37 
*
  The case study’s data was used with permission from Karagöz, S. M.S. Thesis; Thesis; Texas 
A&M University: College Station, TX, 2014. 
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Gathering the input materials took about 3 hours after the simulation was 
finalized. For another process alternative, all that needs to change is the report files from 
the process simulator and the stream list which is usually outputted in a designer’s 
normal workflow. There is a database of chemicals so different plants will have a much 
lower time since the basic chemicals will be automatically outputted with the template. 
Gathering some of the literature values were done manually for each chemical which can 
be expedited with the designer’s own files or memory since these numbers should be 
rather common at this stage in the design. 
6.2 Sanity checks 
The methods after Chem. were formulated to be theoretically centered on zero. 
To check this, the average of all parameters and the units were done just for statistical 
purposes. The result was that the Secondary Effects, Mix, Vessel and Hotspot agreed 
pretty well with this with average values of 0.09, 0.05, 0.02 and 0.04 respectably. Unit-
Unit is entirely different with a value of 0.54 with the range of numbers between zero to 
one. This may be an anomaly with the formulation or a function of the case study used. 
To understand the output, common knowledge and rules of thumb were checked 
to see if the index agrees or disagrees. The most definitive trend was in the effect of the 
unit type with the UDP with the order going compressors, separators, reactors and then 
heaters. Many dangerous units have a highly mobile solution that is also very toxic 
mostly due to the presence of carbon monoxide. There is a group of units that have high 
chemical numbers for fire and expected damage. Some are well managed with the design 
like with the unit B6 which is near the bottom of the unit list, but some are barely 
increasing through the other methods which results in a high overall UDP. 
HotSpot numbers were generally low except for mixers and distillation units. The 
mixers at the beginning of the plant have large values in Acute toxicity and the Runaway 
reaction parameters but not Fire or Chronic toxicity. Heaters and reactors have the Fire 
and Chronic toxicity hazard coming from the evolving chemicals and the general change 
in temperature throughout the process. This is in line with the namesake of this method 
coming from temperature monitoring on PFRs. 
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For the upset conditions, the situation that seemed most influential was a change 
in flow with changes to pressure more important for utilities and inputs to separators. 
Thankfully, the safety sensitive units (identified by units that have high Unit-Unit 
streams as inputs) are not the most dangerous units by UDP. This should be expected 
since the dangerous units may be the ones having the most “dangerous” upsets, sending 
their “dangerousness” to a unit that may not be able mitigate the hazards. This is 
highlighted by the units that are most sensitive being those with that are critical for the 
plant for functioning, like recycle streams, outputs of large separators, and feed streams. 
This procedure can check if an inherently safer solution is even applicable with the 
surrounding units or if it degrades the mitigation of hazards in the surrounding units. 
The resolution gives rise to design solutions with where redundancy can be 
helpful and which groups of units may need reworking. Moreover, a designer can see 
what will be helpful before making detailed calculations. Going back to the equations 
one can see what changes even affect the system and see if a whole area’s hazards can be 
reduced. In this case study, when trying to reduce the toxicity of a reactor “2-23” a 
designer may think that the addition of high level alarms or other monitoring systems 
would help. However, the real problem here is in chronic toxicity which is above one 
while acute toxicity is negative. Additionally, all the Vessel parameters are negative or 
zero so efforts should be given to other methods. This means that the best mitigation 
techniques money can buy will still result in a positive hazard because the minimum 
value of a Vessel parameter is -1. Tracking the numbers back to the chemical 
components and their compositions, the main contributor of the hazard is from H2 which 
is highly mobile, explosive and has a chronic health hazard, which this unit and many 
other units possess. This has implications on key design variables like the H2:CO ratio 
that governs a lot of hydrocarbon processing facilities. What this procedure can give is a 
curve between this ratio the economics and the safety portions by tracking different 
alternatives through the index. 
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7 DISCUSSION 
7.1 Improvements and the next step 
As we seen in the previous section, it is not only the separation between the 
chemicals, parameters, units and streams that can be examined, trends with unit type and 
even “spatial” distribution of the units. Communication to different parties can be 
customized by isolating these factors and telling the story that is relevant for the work 
relationship. A P&ID design team may be more interested in the stream and spatial 
orientation, while a chemist might want to improve upon the chemical or unit specific 
hazards. Related to this is that if you disregard the parameter or method dimensions to 
the final number, it tells a familiar story throughout the calculations. This allows the 
numbers to be statistically relevant when being added together and is useful for 
optimization on the big picture scale. When looking at specific implementations or 
design decisions, the differences between the parameters and the methods are rich and 
give insights on how the plant will perform. 
To facilitate this exchange of information the output could have sections 
dedicated to each frame of reference on the problem with the spatial section being an 
interactive flowsheet with the values imbedded. Just by looking at the unit list one can 
see units 16-18 and 28, 30 are high which suggests that the overall process in that section 
is a problem. This is trying to approach a bigger picture mentality than a HazOp review 
where these units may not be even on the same review section, which would result in 
separate recommendations for a similar problem.  
7.2 Conclusions 
The IEHS index has been proposed as a tool to support decision making at the 
conceptual design level. The index quantifies important design decisions with respect to 
chemical, process equipment, and interactions. The index also addresses the interaction 
between process design and operability with the additions of failure rates and upset 
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conditions. The type of information used in the IEHS calculations is appropriate and 
readily available during process synthesis and preliminary flowsheet screening. The 
conceptual and physical separation between the different methods and the different 
parameters used in the index was used extensively to model many different situations 
and trace back the numbers to the science. The largely independent methods allowed for 
a statistically relevant aggregation from simple addition. Additionally, it allowed a 
rudimentary targeting system to be implemented allowing for questions like, “If I focus 
on this one aspect of the design, what is the largest reduction I can see in the final index 
value as well as the specific method parameter pair?” A case study has been solved to 
demonstrate the merits of the proposed index. 
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APPENDIX A 
TABLES 
Table A.1. The phenomenon accounted for when the index is used 
Method Parameters Things taken into account / specific model used 
Initial 
Values 
Mobility Gas release (MW, ρ), 
Flashing liquid, 
Liquid release (Volatility and Viscosity) 
Fire Flash point (or predicted) 
LFL (or predicted) 
LOC(or predicted) 
Acute Toxicity TLV-C 
TLV-STEL 
IDLH 
LC50-inhal 
Probability of a 
runaway 
Adiabatic temperature rise 
Auto ignition temperature 
Self-reactivity 
Expected 
damage 
Reaction Energy 
Decomposition energy 
Combustion Energy 
Explosion Fundamental burning velocity 
Energy of explosion 
Maximum Overpressure 
Oxygen content 
Irritation LD50-dermal 
SDS info 
pH 
Chronic 
Toxicity 
TLV-TWA (or predicted) 
Water Effects Fish (Fathead minnow) LC50 (or predicted) 
Small organism (Daphnia magna) LC50 (or predicted) 
Bacteria (T. Pyriformis) LC50 (or predicted) 
Air effects ERPG2 
RfD 
Chronic toxicity index 
Solid effects Yes or no (user input) 
Bioaccumulation Bioaccumulation factor (or predicted) 
67 
Octanol-water partition coefficient (or predicted) 
Degradation Persistency (or predicted) 
Half-life (or predicted) 
Mixing 
Factor 
Mobility Diffusion interaction (Molar weight, harmonic mean) 
Fire Presence of the fire triangle 
LFLmix (Heat of combustion) 
LFLmix (Le Chatlier) 
Toxicity Overall Exposure 
ToxInfomix (Le Chatlier) 
Probability of a 
runaway 
reaction 
CRW report 
Explosion Fundamental burning velocitymixed (equivalence ratio) 
BLEVE  
Vessel 
Failure rate Literature checked with design specifications 
Extremity of 
conditions 
Literature giving safe operating ranges for a type of vessel 
Alterations Semi-qualitative user input changing the constants for the 
previous two examples 
Unit-
Unit 
General upset  Vessel average of the upstream model used to
determine size of the upset on the current model
 Make upset stream for a given variable and
guideword (more, less)
 15 min upset of said stream into the current unit
(RMP)
 If the space time is smaller than 15 minutes, the
upset progresses into the next unit until the 15
minutes are up
 Redo the index on the entire changed plant
 Summation of all the differences between the
upset and the normal conditions averaged over all
the different types of upsets results in the method
value.
